Entrepreneurs often get their ideas from working as employees in established firms. However, employees with ideas can also become intrapreneurs, or even managers of corporate spin-offs. This paper shows how innovation and entrepreneurship are influenced by company policies. Using a multi-task incentives model, we identify a trade-off between focussing employees on their assigned tasks, versus encouraging their exploration of new ideas. We show how the rate of innovation, and the organizational structure of new ventures (startups, spin-offs, internal ventures) depend on factors such as the entrepreneurial environment and the allocation of intellectual property rights.
Where do entrepreneurs come from? Employees of established companies turn out to be one of the most important source for entrepreneurship. The semiconductor industry, for example, has an impressive genealogy, where, generation after generation, employees left their parent company to launch the next entrant. 1 In a sample of fast-growing private companies, Bhide (1994) finds that "71% of all founders had replicated or modified an idea encountered through previous employment." Similarly, Cooper (1985) reports in a broad cross section of industries that 70% of all founders pursued opportunities closely related to their previous employment.
A popular response is that established firms are "stupid" to miss out on all these opportunities. To economists this hardly provides a systematic explanation. 2 A central tenet of this paper is that the departure of employees to become entrepreneurs can be understood as a natural equilibrium outcome in the process of innovation. In addition, we stress that it is not the only possible equilibrium outcome. While some employees leave, others stay to develop their innovations internally, turning employees into intrapreneurs. 3M, for example, is famous for its policies that allow employees to use 15% of their time to develop new ideas. The company also has an objective of generating 25% of its sales from products that are less than five years old (See Bartlett and Mohammed (1995) ). Other firms use their employees' innovations to found spin-offs. Thermo-Electron is an example of a company that makes extensive use of spin-offs (See Allen (1998)). To get a better understanding of the supply of entrepreneurs, we need to ask how companies handle employee innovations?
This paper examines the question of when employees become entrepreneurs from an economic theory perspective. It jointly addresses the two fundamental questions of when employees generate innovations, and whether these innovations are developed inside or outside the firm. The analysis is based on four key ingredients:
1. Employee-driven innovations: Our analysis is concerned with regular employees working in a company's main line of business, rather than employees specifically hired for R&D. 3 As part of their planned activities, employees serendipitously obtain new ideas, that fall outside their assigned job task. The attraction of exploring these unplanned ideas is that employees may generate innovations that create economics rents, larger than they could hope for by sticking to their assigned job tasks. But while employees may view these ideas as opportunities, the firm may view them as distractions, since employees exploring their ideas may loose focus on the core tasks that sustain the firms' existing lines of business.
Our model distinguishes between ideas, innovations and new ventures. As part of their regular employment activities, employees sometimes get new ideas. To turn them into innovations, they need to explore these ideas, assessing their technical and/or commercial viability. This exploration stage can be thought of as so-called "skunkwork," where employees quietly focus on their own project, rather than on what the boss wants. We model the trade-off between focussing on the assigned employment tasks versus exploring new ideas as a multi-task problem. If an idea is found to be viable, we call it an innovation. At this point it requires resources to be developed into a new venture. Resources may be provided by the firm. In this case the employee becomes an intrapreneur. Or the employee uses outside resources (e.g., venture capital), thus becoming an entrepreneur.
2. Endogenous corporate strategy: Strategic management scholars often argue that firms face a fundamental trade-off between exploitation and exploration. When firms focus on exploiting incremental improvements in their core businesses, they often miss opportunities outside that core focus. 4 In our model, firms can influence how much their employees focus on core tasks versus new ideas. In addition to setting monetary incentives, firms devise policies towards the development of employee innovations. They can either promote exploration by offering to develop innovations, or they can promote exploitation by blocking the development of innovations that fall outside their core focus. 3 . Differences in the entrepreneurial environment: Economic geography scholars note that the supply of entrepreneurs differs widely across different environments. Saxenian (1994) credits the success of Silicon Valley largely to its fluidity in the labor market, and the ease of starting new companies. Empirically studies confirm that employment mobility and the rate of start-ups is significantly higher in Northern California than anywhere else. 5 Our model parameterizes the entrepreneurial environment through the attractiveness of developing an innovation with outside resources. An important part of the analysis is to explain how this parameter affects the behavior of employees and firms. We first take the environment exogenously given, and later show how to endogenize it. 4 . Alternative regimes of intellectual property rights: Legal scholars argue that yet another important factor is the intellectual property regime. Gilson (1999) shows that Californian courts do not enforce non-compete clauses, even if voluntarily agreed upon. Hyde (1998) emphasizes a employee-friendly attitude of Californian courts with respect to trade secret laws. Our analysis considers two main regimes, where intellectual property rights belong either to the employee or to the firm. An extension considers imperfect intellectual property protection, where employees may go ahead even without formally owning the intellectual property.
The central tenet of the paper is that the rate of innovation, and the rate at which employees become entrepreneurs or intrapreneurs, depends critically on firm strategies, the entrepreneurial environment, and the intellectual property regime. We first show that as long as firms own the intellectual property rights, they prefer a strategy of exploitation. In order to focus employees on their core tasks, firms refuse to develop other innovations. In equilibrium, there is no exploration of new ideas.
If the employee owns the intellectual property rights, and the external environment is inhospitable to entrepreneurs, the same equilibrium occurs. However, as the entrepreneurial environment improves, exploring ideas becomes more tempting. An equilibrium occurs, where employees sometimes generate innovations, even though the firm does not support this. The employees take their innovations outside, even though internal venturing would sometimes be more efficient. An interesting model prediction is that employees leave firms when they perceive weak prospects for the firm's core activities. Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2003) provide empirical evidence that "spawning" rates increases when firms are facing a slow-down in their main lines of business.
If the entrepreneurial environment improves even further, firms can no longer stem the "entrepreneurial tide." They decide to "go with the flow" by offering to develop their employees' innovations. While employees make efficient choices between staying or leaving the firm at the development stage, they pursue too many ideas at the exploration stage. The equilibrium mirrors the experiences of many established companies at the height of the Internet boom. Rather than focussing on their "old economy" tasks, employees were much more interested in exploring their own "new economy" ideas. Firms responded to the growing number of departing employees by setting up a variety of internal venturing programs. 6 Giving employees intellectual property rights thus increases the rate of innovation and start-ups. But that does not mean it is socially efficient. The model derives a fundamental trade-off between promoting innovation by giving rights to employees, versus protecting value generation in existing businesses by giving rights to firms.
We show that neither allocation of intellectual property rights achieves the first-best equilibrium, nor does one regime clearly dominate the other.
An extension of the model recognizes that intellectual property rights may be imperfect. Even if firms formally own the intellectual property rights, employees may find ways around them. We show that as long as firms want to discourage exploration, they refuse to cooperate with departing employees. In equilibrium firms may even go after departing employees with costly lawsuits. This matches Jackson's (2000) account of how Intel treated its departing employees with great hostility, including vengeful lawsuits. Burgelman (2003) also shows how during this period, Intel was committed to a focus strategy, at the expense of exploring new ideas. On the other hand, if firms are open to exploration, they can coopt their employees' innovations by doing internal ventures or "spin-offs." 7 This matches Chesbrough's (2003) description of how in the nineties Xerox implemented a corporate venturing program to make the best of its employee's innovations, sorting out which ones to develop as internal ventures or spin-offs.
Our model provides a unified framework for analyzing the different ways in which ideas are turned into new venture, including start-ups, internal ventures and spinoffs. With this, it dispels two popular notions about the role of intellectual property rights. One is that intellectual property rights pre-determine how ideas are turned into ventures. It is often believed that if firms have the rights, they develop innovations internally, and if employees have the rights, they start their own firms. Our results challenge this view: internal ventures may well occur when employees have the intellectual property rights, and spin-offs may occur when firms have the rights. The second notion is that intellectual property rights are irrelevant. The Coase theorem does not apply, because the firm may commit to a corporate strategy that involves deliberate ex-post inefficiencies. This optimal strategy depends on the allocation of intellectual property rights.
A separate reason why firms may be hostile to departing employees is if new ventures cannibalize the firms' existing profits. We find that firms may respond to the threat of cannibalization in two distinct ways. One response is ex-ante prevention, discouraging the exploration of ideas. The ex-post response is to strike deals with departing employees, to shelve those innovations that inefficiently cannibalize existing profits. We show that firms may resort to either of these two strategies, although they will not use them jointly.
A final extension of the model examines the interrelationship between firm strategies and the entrepreneurial environment. It suggests that there may be multiple equilibria with varying degrees of entrepreneurial activity. If many employees become entrepreneurs, there are strong incentives for others to invest developing the 7 We reserve the term "spin-off" to describe the case where an innovation is developed with outside resources, but with the cooperation of the old firm. For example, the old firm may grant access to the intellectual property, in return for an equity stake. We distinguish this from "start-ups," where the external ventures has no formal link to the old firm. entrepreneurial infrastructure. Venture capitalists, for example, are likely to locate where there are many entrepreneurs. If the entrepreneurial infrastructure is strong, employees face considerable temptation to explore their ideas. Firms find it difficult to focus their employees, and many employees become entrepreneurs. This creates a virtuous cycle and the possibility for multiple equilibria. It also agrees with the observation that some environments, like Silicon Valley, have not only an active venture capital market, but also a constant flux of people leaving established firms to create new ones, whereas other environments, such as Japan or parts of Europe, witness both a weak venture capital market and few employees leaving established firms to become entrepreneurs. This paper concerns the supply of entrepreneurship, which has received surprisingly little attention in the economics literature. Nonetheless, the paper builds on a diverse set of related literatures. First, there is a growing number of papers about the trade-off between internal versus external venturing. Pakes and Nitzan (1983) examine the efficient development decision when there is a potential for cannibalization. Yao (1994, 1995) look at the role of weak property rights. Gromb and Scharfstein (2001) consider the effect of a stigma of failure. Amador and Landier (2003) examine entrepreneurial optimism. Hellmann (2002) analyzes the value-added support of a strategic versus independent venture capitalist. Cassiman and Ueda (2002) focus on a firm's trade-off between investing in one employee's innovation today, versus waiting for a better opportunity tomorrow. All these papers take the generation of ideas as given. Aghion and Tirole (1994) , Anand and Galetovic (2000) , and Gans and Stern (2000) consider models of incomplete contracts where a holdup at the development stage may influence investment decisions at the innovation generation stage.
The current paper differs from all of the above in several important respects. (i) It considers a larger set of development alternatives, explaining start-ups (with or without intellectual property rights), internal ventures, spin-offs, and even the shelving of an innovation. (ii) It uses a multi-task incentive framework to characterize the employee's incentive problem (Holmström and Milgrom, 1994) . (iii) The analysis does not rely on incomplete contracts. (iv) The paper explicitly introduces corporate strategy into the analysis. This approach builds on the work by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), who examine the benefits of narrow business strategy.
A few recent papers also discuss the importance of employee mobility for innovation. Rajan and Zingales (2002) examine how the threat of employee departures affects firm's hiring decisions. Lewis and Yao (2001) examine how firms can attract talented employees that value mobility. Hellmann and Perotti (2003) show how firms can be thought of as deliberate boundaries on the circulation of ideas, so that the role of firms is to prevent employees from appropriating each other's ideas. Lester and Talley (2000) , Merges (1999) and Talley (1998) raise legal and normative issues of employee departures, weighing up a employee-friendly perspective that employees should be entitled to the fruits of their own creativity, against a firm-friendly perspec-tive that employees should not develop their business ideas at the employers' expense. The paper is also related to the literatures on internal resource allocation (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994) , task delegation (Holmström and Milgrom, 1994, Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and incentives in spin-offs (Aron, 1991) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 develops the basic model. Section 2 derives optimal firm policies under alternative intellectual property regimes. Section 3 examines the efficiency of the intellectual property regimes. Section 4 expands the analysis to imperfect intellectual property rights. Section 5 considers the problem of cannibalization. Section 6 discusses multiple equilibria. Section 7 provides some further discussion. It is followed by a brief conclusion. All proofs are in the appendix.
Model
Suppose there is a wealth-constrained employee, denoted by E, and a firm, denoted by F . At date 0 an employment contract is drafted. At date 1 the employee may obtain a new idea. She has a choice about whether to explore the idea or to focus on her assigned employment task. If she explores her idea, she discovers at date 2 whether or not the idea is feasible. If it is feasible, the idea can be developed inside or outside the firm. All returns accrue at date 3. All parties are risk-neutral profit maximizers. There is no discounting. Figure 1 illustrates the time line.
We focus first on the idea exploration stage at date 1. As part of her regular job activities, the employee may serendipitously get a new idea, that falls outside the established line of business. When she gets such an idea, she can choose to ignore or explore it. We model this as a multi-task problem, where she can focus either on project A or B.
A denotes the assigned employment task, which may include a large variety of activities that improve the firm's current core businesses. If successful, the assigned task generates a value a, which is entirely captured by the firm. At date 1, the employee has a non-verifiable binary signal about the likelihood of success: either the prospects for the core task are "strong," so that success is certain; or they are "weak," so that the probability of success is given by φ < 1.
B represents exploring a new idea. There are two stages to turning an idea into a successful venture: exploring the idea and developing the innovation. If the employee explores her idea at date 1, she finds out at date 2 whether it is feasible (which occurs with probability p) or not. If it is not feasible, all parties receive zero utility. If it is feasible, we call the idea an innovation. A development effort is then required to generate value from the innovation. The employee has a unique skill for -or understanding of -the innovation, so that she is indispensable for its development. 8 The attraction of exploring an idea is that generating an innovation propels the employee into a unique position, where she might be able to extract some rents. This she cannot do by merely sticking to her assigned employment tasks (see also section 7.1).
If the idea is feasible at date 2, all parties observe the expected returns from developing it. We denote these expected returns by y (x) for an internal (external) development. The expected return y itself is random, with a distribution Ω(y). We can think of y measuring how well the idea fits with the firm's current activities. For simplicity, we let x be a constant (see also section 7.1). At date 1 the expected returns from exploring an idea (that is always implemented) are given by pµ where For simplicity, we assume that all four states are equally likely (see also section 7.1). In states 3 and 4, the employee can only pursues her core task. But in states 1 and 2, she has to choose between focusing on her assigned task (A) or exploring her idea (B). We can thus distinguish three levels of exploration:
Employee never explores ideas σ * : Efficient exploration Employee explores ideas in state 1 but not in state 2 σ + : Excessive exploration Employee explores ideas in state 1 and in state 2
As our vocabulary suggests, we assume that it is efficient to explore in state 1, where the prospects of the core are weak, but not in state 2, when the core prospects are strong. Formally we assume φa < pµ < a.
Since µ is increasing in x, this condition also defines the feasible range of x. The upper boundary is given by x, where x satisfies pµ(x) = a. The lower boundary is simply x = 0, provided that φa < pµ(x = 0), which we assume throughout.
An important part of the analysis is to examine the firm's commitments about developing employee innovations. 9 Let D y and D x be dummies for whether an innovation is developed internally or externally. D y and D x may depend on y. D y = D x = 0 ventures. Yao (1994, 1995) provide an extensive analysis of this problem. 9 Note that we model the development decision as an ex-post decision, but allow the firm to commit to an ex-ante development policy. An equivalent way of thinking about this is that the firm faces an ex-ante decision, where it either invests in a venturing capability, or it doesn't. If it invests means that the project is "shelved," i.e., not developed at all. To implement an innovation internally, the firm needs the employee. This gives the employee some hold-up power. We assume that the employee and the firm bargain according to the Nash solution. The firm can pay the employee her share of the internal development in a variety of ways, such as with an internal equity stake or a transfer payment (that can be thought of as a retention bonus).
We assume that all value realizations are verifiable, so that contracts can be made contingent on them. Specifically, if the employee generates no value in the core, nor any innovation, the firm may reward this with a transfer payment w 0 . If she generates value in the core, but no innovation, the firm may reward this with w A . And if she generates no value in the core, but an innovation, the firm may reward this with a transfer w B . (This would be in addition to the retention bonus from bargaining mentioned above.) In principle, the reward w B may also depend on the signal y, or the development decision (D y , D x ). In equilibrium we always get w B = 0, so that any such additional conditioning will not be needed. Since the employee is wealth constraint, all transfers are from the firm to the employee.
We briefly summarize the information structure of the game. At date 0, the firm and the employee have symmetric information. Conditional on their information, they write a complete contract. At date 1, the employee privately observes the state. She privately chooses whether to focus on the core task (A) or to explore her idea (B). At date 2, the employee's idea is revealed to be feasible or not. If feasible, both parties symmetrically observe the expected values x and y. All returns accrue at date 3 and are divided according to the contract.
There are two regimes of intellectual property rights: the employee-friendly regime (denoted by EIP ) where innovations belong to the employee, and the firm-friendly regime (denoted by F IP ) where innovations belong to the firm. For expositional convenience, we assume that the intellectual property regime is exogenously given. At the end of section 3 we discuss what happens when intellectual property rights are traded endogenously. Section 4 expands these regimes by looking at imperfect property rights (denoted by IIP ).
To remain tractable, the model abstracts from at least two empirically relevant issues. First, the model assumes that ex-ante all employees are the same, abstracting from issues of self-selection at the hiring stage. Second, it assumes that the expected values of an innovation are symmetrically known, excluding issues of disagreement or self-selection at the development stage. However, these omissions may also be viewed as a strength, in so far as the analysis does not rely on these additional complications.
in a venturing capability (e.g., it introduces more flexible capital budgeting rules, creates an internal incubator or corporate venture capital arm), the firm maintains the option to develop internal ideas, generating an expected value of y ∼ Ω(y). But if the firm doesn't invest in any corporate venturing program, then the expected value of y is simple y = 0. This alternative model specification does not require an assumption about ex-post commitment, since the firm defines its development strategy at the ex-ante stage. Table 1 summarizes the key notation. Table 2 summarizes the main results.
Optimal firm policies

The employee-friendly regime
Suppose the employee has the intellectual property rights. She can always develop the innovation outside, if the firm chooses not develop it inside. No innovation is ever shelved. If the innovation is developed outside, the employee obtains x. This is also her outside option when bargaining with the firm over an internal venture. The Nash bargaining values are thus x + y − x 2 for the employee and y − x 2 for the firm. Naturally, internal ventures never occur for y < x.
Consider now the employee's utilities from choosing A or B. It is easy to verify that the firm never wants to compensate failure, so that w 0 = 0. We use this throughout the analysis. At date 1, her utility of focusing on her assigned task (A) is given by w A in state 2 and φw A in state 1. She compares this with the expected utility of exploring her idea (B). This depends on the firm's development policy. It is useful define
δ EIP measures the total benefit from a "cooperative" development policy, where the firm develops innovations inside, when it is efficient to do so. The expected utilities from exploring an idea are thus given by
The employee's optimal choice is determined as follows:
To derive the firm's optimal policy, we calculate the ex-ante utility for each of the three exploration levels σ − . σ * and σ + . We denote the firm's ex-ante utilities by U − F , U * F and U + F . Suppose now the firm wants to implement an equilibrium with no exploration (σ − ), requiring b E ≤ φw A . The lowest value of w A satisfying these constraints is
The firm therefore always prefers to set w B = 0. Similarly, the effect of developing innovations internally (i.e., setting D y (y) = 1) is to increase δ EIP , which increases b E and thus w − A . The firm therefore commits not to develop any of its employees innovations, setting D y (y) = 0 ∀y.
To implement σ * , w A has to satisfy φw
, the firm's ex-ante utility is now given by
). There are two effects to a policy of developing innovations internally. Increasing δ EIP (by setting D y (y) = 1) benefits the firm in state 1, where the employee actually explores her ideas. But it costs the firm in all other states, because a higher δ EIP necessitates greater incentives for the core
< 0, we recognize that the costs outweigh the benefits. It follows that D y (y) = 0 is optimal for all y. The firm finds it optimal to refuse all internal development, even though it looses some profitable opportunities. 10 For
> 0, we note that the optimal development policy is D y (y) = 1 for all y ≥ x. Once the firm is resigned to the fact that the employee explores all of her ideas, it no longer needs to provide incentives. The net benefits of cooperating through internal ventures are then given by
Proposition 1 (Optimal contracts for different exploration levels)
• To implement an equilibrium with no exploration (σ − ), the firm sets strong incentives for the core task (w − A = px φ ), refuses to implement any internal ventures (D y = 0 ∀y), and achieves an ex-ante utility of
• To implement an equilibrium with efficient exploration (σ * ), the firm sets some incentives for the core task (w * A = px), refuses to implement any internal ventures (D y = 0 ∀y), and achieves an ex-ante utility of U * F = 2 + φ 4 (a − px).
• To implement an equilibrium with excessive exploration (σ + ), the firm provides no incentives for the core task (w + A = 0), seizes all opportunities for internal ventures (D y = 1 ∀y ≥ x), and achieves an ex-ante utility of
Proposition 1 shows that the firm has a fundamental choice between fighting or accommodating the employee's desire to explore her own ideas. To fight (i.e., implement σ − or σ * ), the firm has two levers. It can provide incentives for the core task (setting w A > 0), and it can refuse to develop innovations internally (setting D y = 0). To accommodate (i.e., implement σ + ), the firm simply accepts all exploration. It no longer tries to set incentives for the core task, but makes the best of the innovations through internal ventures.
An interesting difference is that for σ + , employees become entrepreneurs if and only if they prefer it over becoming intrapreneurs. By contrast, for σ * , it may be that employees become entrepreneurs, even though they would prefer to become intrapreneurs.
Another interesting difference concerns σ − and σ * . For σ − , the firm has a policy of not developing innovation inside. In equilibrium this policy is never tested, since the employee never explores her ideas. By contrast, under σ * the firm's policy of not developing innovations inside is constantly tested in equilibrium.
So far we contrasted the three policies that the firm might pursue. We now explain when each of them is optimal. We focus on the external environment as a key determinant. The more hospitable the environment is to entrepreneurs, the higher the expected return for taking innovations outside. We capture this as a comparative static of x. Figure 2 
This says that higher returns for developing ideas outside (higher x), are most costly for the firm if it wants to prevent all exploration (σ − ), less costly if the firm tolerates the efficient amount of exploration (σ * ), and least costly if the firm accepts all exploration (σ + ).
To describe the firm's optimal policies, we define b x * − as the critical value of x, below which the firm prefers σ − over σ * , and above which the firm prefers σ * over σ − . Formally, we obtain b
analogously. In the appendix we show that there exists b
Unless specified otherwise, our exposition focuses on the more interesting case of φ < b φ. The appendix develops proofs for all values of φ.
Proposition 2 (Optimal policies under EIP )
• With a weak external environment (x < b
x * − ) the firm implements σ − . In equilibrium there is no idea exploration, so employees never become entrepreneurs or intrapreneurs.
In equilibrium there is efficient exploration. But the firm refuses to make any internal ventures. Employees with innovations always become entrepreneurs.
• With a weak external environment (x > b
x + * ) the firm implements σ + . In equilibrium there is excessive exploration. The firm offers to do internal ventures. Employees with innovations become either entrepreneurs (for y < x), or intrapreneurs (for y ≥ x).
Proposition 2 shows how the entrepreneurial environment influences both the employee's choices and the firm's optimal strategies. If the external environment is inhospitable to entrepreneurs (i.e., x < b
x * − ), it is easy for the firm to provide incentives that keep the employee focussed on her core tasks. In equilibrium, she does not explore her ideas and no innovations are generated. As the entrepreneurial
, the temptation to explore ideas becomes stronger. The firm still rewards core tasks, and discourages exploration by refusing internal ventures. But these incentives work only if the core prospects are strong. If the core prospects are weak, the employee explores her ideas. In equilibrium, her innovations are always developed outside, even if internal venturing is more efficient. If the entrepreneurial environment improves even further (x > b
x + * ), the firm can no longer "stem the entrepreneurial tide." It decides to "go with the flow," no longer attempting to curtail the employee's drive for exploration, but making the best of it by agreeing to internal ventures. 11 The model has some intuitive comparative statics. In the appendix we show that the critical values of x are all increasing in a and −p. This means that a higher return to the core task (high a), or a lower return to idea exploration (low p) expand the range of parameters where σ − is optimal. It also shrinks the range of parameters where σ + is optimal. The range where σ * is optimal shrinks on the lower end, but expands on the higher end.
Proposition 1 how the model can explain different types of ventures, such as start-ups and internal ventures. Table 3 provides an overview of how the different firm policies leads to these different types of venture.
The firm-friendly regime
Suppose the firm holds the intellectual property rights. It can use them to shelve the project (D x = D y = 0). Alternatively, it can develop the innovation internally (D y = 1) or through a spin-off (D x = 1). Without intellectual property rights, the 11 The analysis for φ > b
φ is very similar. The main difference is that for φ > b φ, there is relatively little distinction between weak and strong prospects, so that the firm wants to implement the same outcome across these two states. This means implementing either σ − (for
can be thus thought of as a special case of the model with φ < b φ without the region σ * . employee has no outside option. For an internal (external) development, the employee and the firm both get y 2 (
x 2 ). The expected utilities from exploring an idea are given
[yD y (y) + xD x (y)]dΩ(y). As before we get
In the appendix we rederive the optimal strategies.
Proposition 3 (Optimal policies under F IP )
If the firm has the intellectual property rights, it refuses to develop any innovation outside of its core activities. Formally, it implements σ − , by setting w − A = 0 and D y (y) = D x (y) = 0 ∀y. Proposition 3 is a strong and somewhat surprising result. The firm has a policy to suppress all unplanned innovation. This discourages idea exploration in the first place, and helps to focus employees on the core business. Why does the firm choose such a policy? In principle it would like its employees to pursue new ideas when the core is weak, but not when the core is strong. The problem is that offering a separating contract is costly, since it requires paying a bonus for the core task. A simple policy of not paying such bonuses, and suppressing unplanned innovation is cheaper for the firm. It is interesting to note that the optimal policy in the F IP model closely resembles the optimal policy with x = 0 in the EIP model. In both cases the employee has no outside option, which makes it relatively easy to focus her on the assigned core task.
Efficiency
Comparing Proposition 2 and 3 we recognize that the allocation of intellectual property rights can have a dramatic effect both on the generation and development of innovations. One may be inclined to argue that the firm-friendly regime is inefficient, because it undermines innovation. However, to assess the efficiency of the two regimes, we also need to take into account the value forgone on core tasks.
It is easy to verify that neither regime Pareto-dominates the other: the employee is always better off under EIP , and the firm is always better off under F IP . We focus on the standard efficiency criterion of maximizing the sum of utilities U F + U E . The first-best efficient outcome occurs when the employee explores in state 1, but focuses on the core task in all other states; and when innovations are developed inside if y ≥ x and outside if y < x. We immediately note that neither allocation of intellectual property rights ever achieves this first-best efficient outcome.
We proceed to compare the second-best social efficiencies of EIP and F IP . We focus on the net welfare gain of allocating the intellectual property rights to the employee, which we denote by 
The fundamental trade-off is that F IP generates too little exploration, whereas EIP generates too much. Put differently, under F IP the firm focuses too much on generating value in the core, whereas under EIP there is too little focus on the core tasks. For σ * in the EIP model, we have W * = px
a. Here we encounter a slightly different efficiency trade-off. Again, F IP generates too little exploration. But now the problem with EIP is that the firm has a socially inefficient policy of refusing internal ventures. Proposition 4 formally evaluates these efficiency trade-offs.
Proposition 4 (Efficiency comparisons)
• The first-best efficient equilibrium is never achieved
where under EIP the firm gets efficient exploration (σ * ), the outcome under F IP is always more efficient for lower values of x, but may be less efficient for higher values of x. Formally,
• In a strong external environment (x < b x * − ), where under EIP the firm gets excessive exploration (σ * ), the outcome under F IP may be more efficient for lower values of x, but is always less efficient for higher values of x. Formally,
The two main insights from Proposition 4 are first that neither regime achieves a first-best efficient outcome, and second that there is no clear second-best ranking between EIP and F IP . For some parameters one regime dominates, and for other parameters the other dominates.
So far we assumed that intellectual property rights cannot be transferred. In many cases, this is a reasonable assumption. Californian courts, for example, do not enforce non-compete clauses, irrespective of whether employees voluntarily agreed to them or not. Nonetheless let us briefly consider the case where intellectual property rights can be traded. If the firm has the intellectual property rights, then it never transfers them to the employee in this model, because the employee has no wealth for trading. But if the employee has the intellectual property rights, and W < 0, then there are some gains from trade. Proposition 4 implies that the employee would want to sell off her intellectual property rights whenever x < x * W in an σ * equilibrium, and x < x + W in an σ + equilibrium.
4 Imperfect protection
The extended model
So far the model assumes that intellectual property protection is fully effective, so that if the firm owns the intellectual property rights, it can fully prevent the employee from developing the innovation. We now relax this assumption, recognizing that intellectual property protection is imperfect. For example, if intellectual property rights involve patents, the employee may be able to work around them. If they involve trade secrets, the employee may still develop her innovation, just without using the trade secrets. And if intellectual property is protected by non-compete clauses, the employee may be able to develop her innovation outside the clause's scope, such as waiting out the duration of the clause, or leaving its geographic scope.
We provide an extension of the model where intellectual property rights are imperfect. For this, we assume that the firm formally owns the intellectual property rights. As before, the firm and the employee can cooperate on developing the innovation outside, as a spin-off, and obtain a return x. But in addition, we now allow for the possibility that the employee may develop the innovation as a start-up. This means that the employee proceeds without the firm's cooperation, and without owning the intellectual property rights. We assume that her expected returns from a start-up are given by λx, where λ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree to which the intellectual property rights are imperfect. For λ = 0, intellectual property rights are perfect, so that the employee cannot achieve any returns without them. In this case, the model is equivalent to the F IP model. For λ = 1, intellectual property rights are useless, since the employee can achieve the same returns with or without them. In this case, the model is equivalent to the EIP model.
The possibility of developing the innovation on her own improves the employee's bargaining power. For internal ventures the Nash bargaining values are given by λx + y − λx 2 for the employee and y − λx 2 for the firm. The higher λ, the better off the employee, and the worse off the firm. Similarly, in case of a spin-off, the Nash bargaining values are given by λx +
x − λx 2 for the employee and x − λx 2 for the firm.
To implement this bargaining solution the firm receives an equity stake of 1 − λ 2 %, in return for granting access to the intellectual property. In the appendix we derive the equilibria for this model.
x + * , the firm implements σ * . There is efficient exploration, but the firm refuses to cooperate on any development. In equilibrium, employees become entrepreneurs without the firm's cooperation or intellectual property rights.
• For
There is excessive exploration. The firm develops innovations either as internal ventures (for y < x), or as spin-offs (for y ≥ x).
• The critical values b
x * − , b
x + − and b
x + * are decreasing in λ, as depicted in Figure 3 . Figure 3 provides a simple graphical overview of Proposition 5. For low λ, the model behaves like the F IP model, where the firm finds it optimal to prevent all idea exploration. For high λ, the model is similar to the EIP model. Generally, the range where the firm prevents all exploration (σ − ) is decreasing in λ. And the range of excessive exploration (σ + ) is increasing in λ. Overall, we find that higher values of λ encourage innovation, as shown in Figure 3 .
Note that in the IIP model σ * and σ + represent slightly different outcomes than before. Table 3 provides an overview. For σ + , the firm cooperates on innovations. For y < x, this means internal ventures, just as in the EIP model. But for y ≥ x, the IIP model predicts spin-offs, compared to start-ups in the EIP model. And for σ * the firm refuses to cooperate on innovations. In equilibrium the employee develops all her innovations outside as start-ups. Unlike in the EIP model, however, these start-ups operate without intellectual property rights. Their returns are thus given by λx, rather than x.
Our results so far allows us to dispels two common notions about intellectual property rights. The first is that intellectual property rights pre-determine development, in the sense that one would always get internal development if the firm has the rights, and external development if the employee has the rights. Our results challenge this preconception. We can get internal ventures in the EIP model where the employee has the rights, and spin-offs in the IIP model where the firm has the rights. The second notion is that intellectual property rights are irrelevant. The Coase theorem fails in this model because the firm commits to a corporate strategy of making decisions that, although ex-ante optimal, may lead to inefficient ex-post development.
Lawsuits
A notion closely related to imperfect intellectual property rights is ambiguous intellectual property rights. Laws are not always entirely clear, and courts are not perfectly predictable. If the allocation of intellectual property rights is ambiguous, either party can try to resolve the ambiguity by taking the case to court. Prior to any trial, the two parties may also try to settle, thereby saving legal costs. We now provide a simple model of this.
At date 2, the employee and the firm decide whether to cooperate. We focus on spin-offs as the cooperative outcome, although the case of internal ventures is analogous. If the employee does not cooperate, the firm can threaten with a lawsuit. The parties either settle before trial. Or they go to court, in which case they each incur legal costs k. Let λ now be the probability that the employee wins the trial. If she wins, she can continue with her start-up and earn x. With probability 1 − λ, however, she looses. In this case we assume that the firm shelves the innovation. The appendix shows that this assumption is without loss of generality.
Since the employee is wealth constrained, her legal costs have to be paid with a contingency fee e k that satisfies λ e k = k. For e k > x ⇔ λ < k x , she cannot afford a trial, and concedes defeat. We now focus on the case where λx > k. If there is a lawsuit, the expected utilities are given by λx − k for the employee and −k for the firm. This affects the outside options for a pre-trial settlement. The Nash values for the settlement are given by λx
for the employee
for the firm. Naturally, these settlement values also define the Nash values for the spin-off agreement. We immediately recognize that these are the same values as in the IIP model above, so that Proposition 5 continues to apply.
Consider now how the firm views lawsuits under the three optimal strategies. For σ − , the firm wants to minimize the returns to exploration. This is best achieved by a policy of always going to court. This minimizes the returns to exploration, given by b E = p(λx − k). In equilibrium, the firm never has to take anyone to court, since employees never explore their ideas. For σ * , the returns to exploration are given
Going to court is costly, since in equilibrium the firm actually has to incur legal costs. However, a policy of committing to sue improves ex-ante incentives, in terms of discouraging unwanted exploration. As before the ex-ante concerns dominate, so that the benefits of going to court outweigh the costs. For σ + , the firm is resigned to accepting exploration. It makes the best of the employee's innovations by developing them as internal ventures or spin-offs. The threat of a lawsuit constitutes a bargaining threat, that is never exercised in equilibrium. We summarize these findings as follows.
Proposition 6 (Lawsuits)
• For σ − , the firm uses the threats of lawsuits to deter idea exploration. No lawsuits occur equilibrium.
• For σ * , the firms takes all departing employees to court. The deterrence benefit outweighs the cost of lawsuits that actually occur in equilibrium.
• For σ + , the firm uses the threat of lawsuits when bargaining over the division of rents from internal ventures and spin-offs. No lawsuits occur equilibrium.
Cannibalization
So far, the reason that firms don't want too much unplanned idea exploration is that they fear it distracts employees from their assigned job tasks. This is a new argument against innovation, that is conceptually distinct from the more traditional argument that firms fear cannibalization (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983). We now extend the model to also allow for cannibalization, and ask how a firm optimally responds. One approach is to provide ex-ante incentives that discourage the employee from generating cannibalizing innovations. A very different approach is that after the employee has generated a cannibalizing innovation, the firm strikes a deal to shelve the innovation. We now examine when it is that the firm addresses cannibalization through prevention (the ex-ante approach) or shelving (the ex-post approach). We stay in the IIP model, remembering that the EIP and F IP can be viewed as special cases. Denote the loss from cannibalization by c > 0, where c is an exogenous constant. This specification assumes that cannibalization is an inevitably consequence of the innovation that cannot be mitigated by developing it inside. Below we show how to relax this assumption.
Consider first the ex-post approach to cannibalization. Suppose the employee has found a cannibalizing innovation. The question is whether to develop or shelve it? If c < Max[x, y], cannibalization is sufficiently small that developing the innovation is more efficient than shelving it. The firm simply bears the burden of cannibalization.
The only difference is that the Nash values are now given by λx + Max[x, y] − λx 2 for the employee and −c + Max[x, y] − λx 2 for the firm. 12 If c > Max[x, y], shelving the innovation is more efficient than developing it. The Nash values are then given by λx + c − λx 2 for the employee and −c + c − λx 2 for the firm. Ironically, the employee benefits most from cannibalization when the effect is large, sufficiently large that the firm wants to prevent it from happening. To examine the ex-ante effect of cannibalization, we need to examine how the firm adopts its optimal strategy to prevent cannibalization in the first place. In the appendix we rederive the firm's optimal strategies. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 (Optimal responses to cannibalization)
• The firm prevents cannibalization by choosing more often strategies that prevent idea exploration. The critical boundaries in Figure 3 are all increasing in c.
• For σ * , the firm refuses to respond with ex-post shelving.
• For σ + , the firm does not rely on ex-ante prevention, but responds ex-post by shelving innovations whenever c > Max[x, y].
The most interesting aspect of Proposition 7 is how the ex-ante and ex-post responses interact. Naturally, the firm adapts its ex-ante optimal policies to the threat of cannibalization. The greater c, the more the firm discourages exploration, as reflected by the rightward shift of the the boundaries in Figure 3 . 13 For the ex-post response, there is a fundamental difference between the σ * and the σ + strategy. For σ * , the firm prevents cannibalization by discouraging idea exploration. But in equilibrium, the employee still generates innovations, some of which ought to be shelved. Yet the firm never strikes a deal with an innovative employee, so as not to reward the exploration of ideas. That is, to preserve the effectiveness of its ex-ante policy, the firm refuses to make the efficient ex-post deal. For the σ + strategy, the firm's preferences flip. The firm is resigned to excessive exploration, and no longer relies on ex-ante prevention. It therefore resorts to striking an efficient ex-post deal with the employee whenever shelving is efficient.
Our discussion focuses on the case where the innovation cannibalizes the firm's core profits. Innovations could also generate complementarities for the firm's core business. Complementarities are the opposite of cannibalization, so that we can describe them by c < 0. Naturally, shelving is never an issue. And from Proposition 7 we see that greater complementarities shift the boundaries in Figure 3 to the left. Complementarities thus encourage exploration.
So far c is an exogenous constant. The extent of cannibalization may also depend on whether an innovation is developed internally or outside. Internalizing the venture might give the firm better control, allowing it to endogenously reduce the extent of cannibalization to c − ψ (where ψ > 0). This does not change the essential workings of the model. Straightforward calculations show that such an endogenous mitigation translates into upward shift in the distribution of y, from y to y + ψ. This increases the attractiveness of internal ventures over spin-offs.
Multiple equilibria
So far our analysis focusses on an individual firm, that takes the outside environment as given. An interesting question to ask is what determines the entrepreneurial environment itself. The recent work by Gromb and Scharfstein (2001) and Landier (2002), for example, notes that there may be multiple equilibria in entrepreneurial markets, due to differences in the stigma of failure.
The present model suggests some further important determinants for the level of entrepreneurial activity. We identify employees who generate ideas inside firms as a critical supply source for entrepreneurship. The level of entrepreneurial activity therefore depends on firm policies towards employee innovations. But we already saw that firm policies themselves depend on the level of entrepreneurial activity. The two are determined jointly, and this can lead to multiple equilibria.
Consider a model extension where x is determined endogenously. Let V (x) be the demand for resource providers, such as venture capitalists. 14 V (x) depends on the number of employees becoming entrepreneurs, and therefore on corporate strategy. For the EIP model, Figure 4 shows the demand for venture capital V (x). 15 Next consider the supply of venture capital. A potential entrant has to decide on whether to expand into a new geographical area, or whether to acquire expertise in a new technological area. For simplicity we assume that there is only one potential venture capitalist, who's net benefit of investing is given by a standard concave function z(x). 16 He faces a private cost of offering better quality, given by a standard convex function Z(x). The venture capitalist thus maximizes V z(x) − Z(x) w.r.t. x. The optimal choice x(V ) constitutes the supply of venture capital. This is an increasing function of V , as depicted in Figure 4 . 14 We can also think of other resource providers, such as a local government that is considering investments in its entrepreneurial infrastructure, say by offering incubator facilities, or providing fiscal incentives. 15 An interesting aspect about the demand is that it may be locally non-monotonic in x. 
has a discontinuous drop at b
x + * . 16 The model can easiely be generalized to the case where there are several resource providers. See also Amador and Landier (2003) .
Proposition 8 (Multiple equilibria)
Suppose x depends on the supply decisions of a venture capitalist.
• In the EIP model, there may be multiple equilibria, in any of the three regions σ − , σ * and σ + .
• In the F IP model, the unique equilibrium is σ − at x = 0.
For the F IP model, employees never become entrepreneurs. Thus V = 0, and x = 0 becomes the unique equilibrium. By contrast, Figure 4 shows how there can be multiple equilibria in the EIP model. If x = 0, employees are not interested in start-ups and the firm finds it optimal to choose the o − strategy. The lack of start-ups ensures that x remains low, since venture capitalists see no entrepreneurial activity to peek their interest. The economy is thus trapped in a self-fulfilling low entrepreneurship equilibrium. In contrast, if x is sufficiently large, employees are keen to explore their ideas and found new ventures, and firms retreat to the o + strategy. The high start-up rate provides incentives for venture capitalists to invest, and the economy finds itself in a self-fulling high innovation equilibrium.
We thus identify a fundamental complementarity between the willingness of employees to become entrepreneurs, and the willingness of financiers to develop a venture capital industry. This is consistent with cross-country differences in entrepreneurship levels. In the US employees seems quite willing to leave their employer to start new businesses. And there is an active venture capital industry that finances those departing employees. In Japan and Germany, by contrast, long-term employment is much more prevalent, and few employees want to leave their jobs. At the same time, these countries have a much smaller venture capital industry. Consistent with our analysis, Becker and Hellmann (2003) report how German venture capitalists lament the lack of capable managers who are willing to leave established firms to become entrepreneurs. Even within the US, there seem to be significant regional differences in this respect (Saxenian, 1994) . Our analysis suggests that employee-friendly intellectual property rights are a necessary condition for a high entrepreneurship equilibrium. This is consistent with Gilson (1999) and Hyde (1998) on why California has higher levels of entrepreneurship. Naturally, our analysis can only identify two among several important complementary factors that enable a high level of entrepreneurial activity. Lee et. al. (2000) provide a more comprehensive discussion of the set of complementary institutions that promote high levels of entrepreneurship.
Further discussion
Theory
The base model assumes that the four states of nature are all equally likely. This simplifies the exposition, but does not affect the main results. In the appendix we outline the model where the state probabilities (denoted by s i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4) can take on any value. The model behaves as before. The only notable difference is that under σ * , refusing to do internal ventures (i.e., setting δ = 0) is only optimal for s 1 < s 2 + s 3 φ + s 4 . This condition requires that state 1 (employee has an idea and the core prospects are weak) is not too frequent. If this condition is not satisfied, then the firm in willing to make internal ventures even under σ * . This result reinforces the model's realm of applicability. We noted in the introduction that the model applies to regular line-of-business employees, who have well-defined job tasks. They would not really be expected to generate new ideas, implying that s 1 would not be very large. The case of a large s 1 applies better to R&D employees, who are expected to generate new ideas. To model predicts that for such R&D employees, the firm would welcome more unplanned ideas.
The base model assumes that the employee has a natural preference to explore ideas, rather than do her assigned task. This is because we assumed that she cannot extract any rents from the assigned task. The assumption of a preference for exploration is central to the analysis. In the appendix we show that if the employee has a natural preference for the assigned task -she can extract sufficient rents from itthen the equilibrium outcome is the efficient outcome. That is, the optimal contract ensures that the employee focuses on the assigned task if the core is strong, and explores her ideas when it is weak. This requires a monetary incentive for exploring ideas, i.e., w B > 0. Naturally, the results of the paper come back for an appropriate distributions of preferences. For example, suppose all employees have ideas, but some have a preference for exploration whereas others for the assigned task. Such a model is very similar to the current model. We only need to relabel employees that have no ideas, as employees that have ideas, but prefer to stick to their core task.
The analysis depends on the assumption that the employee is wealth constrained. If this is not the case then it is easy to show that the firm always implements the first-best outcome. The reason for this is that we have kept the model sufficiently simple. Without wealth constraints there are no other costs of providing incentive. To examine a non-trivial model without wealth constraints, we would have to further complicate the model by recognizing other incentive costs, presumably related to informational imperfections or risk-aversion. See Gibbons (1998) for an excellent survey of the vast literature on incentives and their costs.
Finally, the main model assumes that x is a constant. It is conceptually straightforward, to allow for a random external return. Let ξ be such a random return. We then define x as the expected value of ξ, i.e., x = RR ξdΩ(ξ, y), and µ = RR Max[ξ, y]dΩ(ξ, y), where Ω(ξ, y) is the joint distribution of ξ and y. The analysis of this model is technically more tedious, but yields the same results.
Empirical predictions
This paper is motivated by a large number of empirical regularities. The introduction discusses how a variety of empirical literatures from strategic management, law and economics, economic geography and the economics of innovation, all inform the basic research question and model-set up. We now turn to the question of what additional empirical predictions are generated by the model.
The paper makes prediction about the rate at which employees generate innovations, and the rates at which those innovations get developed as internal ventures, start-ups and spin-offs. By and large, these rates are all increasing in quality of the entrepreneurial environment (higher x), and how employee-friendly intellectual property rights are (higher λ). They are also increasing if the firm experiences a lower core performance (lower a and/or lower φ). A recent empirical study by Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2003) , looks at "spawning" rates of established companies. Firms located in entrepreneurial clusters have higher spawning rates. California, which has a particularly employee-friendly environment, has the highest spawning rates. And companies that experience a performance decline are also more likely to spawn. These findings are exactly in line with our model predictions. Moreover, Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein find that more focussed companies have higher spawning rates, providing direct evidence for our core hypothesis.
The model also makes some additional predictions that have not been tested so far. One important prediction is that entrepreneurial activity and internal ventures are complements, not substitutes. This has some important implications for a public policy debate, especially in Europe and Japan. Some people there argue that lacking an environment that is friendly for entrepreneurs (e.g., high entry barriers, lots of red tape, limited venture capital) is not a serious problem, because innovation inside large company can compensate for the lack of entrepreneurs. This paper casts doubt on such reasoning, showing that firms adopt more innovative policies, only when faced by a threat of employees leaving to become entrepreneurs.
Finally, the paper makes some new predictions about how firm policies depend on the entrepreneurial environment and the intellectual property regime. It argues that firms place greater emphasis on conformity and tasks completion when the employees' outside options are weak. Firms become more flexible and open towards employee innovations when outside options are strong. Future empirical work might look at how human resource policies and task definitions depend on the employees' outside options.
Conclusion
This paper starts with the observation that many entrepreneur receive their ideas while working for firms in related industries. It builds a model of when an employee wants to become an entrepreneur. A critical step of the analysis is to recognize that firms may respond to their employees' innovations in a variety of ways. Some firms want to prevent their employees from leaving, whereas others coopt them through internal ventures or spin-offs. The paper provides a unified framework for understanding the various ways by which innovations are turned into new ventures, such as internal ventures, spin-offs and start-ups, with or without intellectual property rights. The analysis highlights the importance of intellectual property rights and the entrepreneurial environment.
The paper addresses the supply of entrepreneurs. This is a wide open research question in economics. Another important source of entrepreneurs, especially in high technology sectors, is academia. Understanding how the trade-offs faced by universities resemble or differ from those of established firms remains a fascinating topic for future research. 
For all proofs, it will useful to use the following notation:
We thus focus on the condition U +
There is no general analytical solution. In the proof of Proposition 4 we provide some numerical examples. We next examine when the critical values lie in the feasible range. For the lower boundary, we note that at x = 0 we have U − F = 2 + 2φ 4 a, U * F = 2 + φ 4 a and U + F = p 2
Thus U − F is always optimal at x = 0, implying b
φ. Thus, the relevant critical values are always above the lower bound of the feasible range.
Concerning the upper bound, for φ < b φ we check that b x + * < x. We note that b
we now show that the upper boundary is typically satisfied, except for some extreme parameters. If the condition b
x + − < x holds, then the firm finds it optimal to implement σ − for x < b
the firm finds it optimal to implement σ − for all x. To examine the condition b
x + * , and thus b
x + − = b x + * < x, as shown above. For higher values of φ, we note that if
For the comparative statics, we immediately see that b
is increasing in a and −p. To see the same for b
x + * , remember that it is defined from Υ + * (b x + * ) = 0. We note that
And from
Proof of Proposition 3
For
. The effect of developing innovations internally or externally is to increase b E , which increases w − A . Thus D y (y) = D x (y) = 0 ∀y. This implies w − A = 0 and U − F = 2 + 2φ 4 a. For σ * , we have
The incentive cost of developing innovations outweighs their direct benefit, so that shelving is optimal, i.e., D y (y) = D x (y) = 0 ∀y. Thus w * A = 0 and U * F = 2 + φ 4 a. It is immediate that σ * is always dominated by σ − . For σ + , it is easy to see the firm always makes the best of all innovations, so that D y (y) = 1 for y ≥ x and D x (y) = 1 for y < x. This implies δ F IP = µ and thus b
To see that σ + is also dominated by σ − , we note that
Proof of Proposition 4
To see that W * and W + are increasing in x, simply note that
We focus first on the case of φ < b φ and begin by examining the range where the firm implements σ * , i.e.,
To consider the lower boundary of this region, we simply evaluate
. We
This says that F IP is more efficient for x sufficiently close to b
x * − . Naturally, we want to know whether F IP is more efficient over the entire range [b x * − , b
x + * ], or whether EIP becomes more efficient for higher values of x. For this, we define x * W so that W * = 0, i.e., 
We
. Again, we also examine whether for higher values of φ, it is possible that x + W > b
x + * , so that F IP more efficient for the lower and EIP more efficient for the upper range. To show that x + W > b x + * is indeed possible for higher values of φ, we focus on φ = b φ. Naturally, the same results holds for φ sufficiently close to b φ. Our aim is thus to show that it is possible that
Anticipating the last part of the proof (where we examine the case of φ > b φ), we show the slightly more general result that both
. We can use this
. This can be positive or negative depending on the value of b φ. b φ is determined by the non-linear equation
. This depends on µ, and thus on the distribution Ω(y), so that no general analytical solution exists. Thankfully, to show that W + (b x, b φ) may be positive or negative, it is enough to construct two simple numerical examples. The calculations for this numerical example were performed in Excel, and are available from the author upon request. For Ω(y) we use the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
Standard calculations show that
. After transformation, the nonlinear 
Proof of Proposition 5
As before we have w 0 = w B = 0, so that b E = pλx + p δ IIP 2
To discourage exploration, the firm sets D y (y) = D x (y) = 0 ∀y, which yields b E = pλx.
It follows that U
). For σ * , the firm has to trade-off the benefits of cooperation against the cost of encouraging more exploration. Cooperation means doing internal ventures (D y = 1) or spin-offs (D x = 1), both of which increases δ IIP . The firm's ex-ante utility is given by 
Again, we find that
We now show that b
, which is decreasing in
As in Proposition 2, we note that if
We thus focus on evaluating
we obtain
]. This is almost exactly the same expression as in Proposition 2, the only difference being that µ(b x * − ) depends on λ. The critical value b φ is defined by the non-linear equation
, which now depends on λ. For λ → 0, we get b φ → 0.
The biggest difference to Proposition 2 pertains to when the critical values lie within the feasible range. Again, the lower boundary is never binding. This follows from the fact that b
x + * are all decreasing in λ, and that we already established in Proposition 2 (where λ = 1) that the lower boundary is never binding. For the upper boundary, we also know from Proposition 2 that for λ = 1, b
a p = 0. At λ = 0, this reduces to c < x, the firm always prefers to develop the innovation, and δ IIP = µ−λx, as before. But for c > x, the firm wants to shelve the innovation whenever y < c. This implies
measures the expected benefit from a policy of shelving all innovations with y < c.
Conveniently writing C = 0 for c < x, the firm's ex-ante utility from σ + is given
a. Consider next σ * . As before, we get dU *
the firm's ex-ante utility from σ * is given by
the firm also maintains a policy of never bargaining, so that
We now show that, provided c not too large, the critical values b
which is always positive for c sufficiently close to b x + * . For even higher values of c, however, it may be that db x + * dc is negative, such as if Ω 0 (c) is locally particularly large. Finally, consider b
x + − , which satisfies µ − 2c + C + 2 + φ φ λb x + − − (1 + φ) a p = 0. Totally differentiating we get 
, this condition can also be rewritten as
. The comparison of U − F , U * F and U + F is analogous to the main model. One minor point worth pointing out is that under F IP , it may now also be possible that σ + is optimal for large values of x. To see this, we
. Whilst the second term is always negative, the first term can be positive, such as for low values of φ. For s 1 sufficiently large relative to s 2 , it is thus possible that U + F − U − F > 0.
Preferences for core task (for section 7)
Suppose that the employee can obtain some rents from A. We parameterize her ability to extract rents by γ, so that the employee gets γa whereas the firm gets γa. We now assume that the employee has a natural preference for the assigned task. This means that in the absence of any monetary incentives, she prefers A over B in all states. This means that we now impose φγa > p µ + λx
. For simplicity, we assume that this condition to hold for all x. This requires that the upper boundary of x is defined by x = Min[x 0 , x 00 ], where a = pµ(x 0 ) and φγa = p µ(x 00 ) + λx 00 2 . Also note that b γ < 1 since b γ = p µ(x) + λx 2φa ≤ p µ(x) + λx 2φa ≤ p µ(x 00 ) + λx 00 2φa = γ < 1.
We recalculate the firm's optimal strategy. We use the IIP model, so that EIP and F IP are special cases. For σ − , the incentive compatibility constraints are given by φ(γa + w A ) ≥ b E + pw B and γa + w A ≥ b E + pw B . As before setting δ IIP = 0 discourages exploration, and we get b E = pλx. And since φγa > p µ + λx 2 > pλx, the firm simply sets w A = w B = 0, and gets U − F = 2 + 2φ 4 γa.
For σ * , the incentive compatibility constraints are φ(γa + w A ) ≤ b E + pw B and γa + w A ≥ b E + pw B . Suppose at first that w A = 0 and δ IIP = µ − λx so that b E = p µ + λx 2 . The incentive constraints simplify to γa ≥ p µ + λx 2 + pw B ≥ φγa.
The lowest value of w B to satisfy them is w * B = φγa p − µ + λx 2 (= φa(γ − b γ) p > 0).
Since w B > 0, we immediately see that increasing w A or decreasing δ IIP is never optimal. The firm gets U * F = σ * is the firm's optimal choice. To see see that, we verify that U *
The analysis for F IP is similar. Implementing σ − is as before, so that U − F = 2 + 2φ 4 γa. Implementing σ * requires a higher incentive pay, since the employee get fewer rents from the innovation. We have w * Under an extreme focus strategy ( − σ ) ideas are never explored, and no innovations are generated.
